Principle: Content of an accountability indicator/outcomes set - an accountability indicators/outcomes set consists of the following three groups of indicators/outcomes: [Provisional only]
1) Accountability indicators/outcomes - indicators/outcomes which a control organization and an intervention organization agree the intervention organization will be held accountable for.
2) Negative sanction accountability reduction indicators/outcomes (i.e. "blame reduction") indicators/outcomes - indicators/outcomes which are outside the control of the intervention organization but which need to occur in order for it to be held accountable for achieving its accountability indicators/outcomes (as listed in 1 above);
3) Positive sanction accountability mitigation indicators/outcomes (i.e. "praise reduction") outcomes - outcomes which may or may not be outside of the control of the intervention organization which, if they occur, make it easier for it to achieve its accountability outcomes but which are not sought by the control organization.
Discussion: In many outcomes systems these three different types of accountability indicators/outcomes are not all specified. In particular Groups 2 and 3 are often not specified. Group 2 is sometimes replaced by an implicit or explicit agreement that if extraordinary factors influence the higher-level outcomes in the outcomes hierarchy that this will be able to be used for "blame reduction". Depending on the type of contracting between the control organization and the intervention organization, there may be no indicators/outcomes specified in Group 3 apart from the implicit or explicit agreement that the intervention organization will not do anything illegal, unethical or which causes political or other embarrassment to the control organization.
Example: An example of 3) above would be where an intervention organization running a community program targeting a reduction in alcohol impaired driving, introduces a non-sustainable number of traffic police into a small community which leads to local people no longer driving for fear of being caught and a reported increase in alcohol related violence in the home settings.
Principle: Accountability specification (contracting) in easy to measure and attribute outcomes hierarchies - In outcomes hierarchies where it is relatively easy to measure and attribute high-level outcomes to a specific intervention organization's intervention(s), accountability specification (contracting) can simply be based on the intervention organization agreeing to be accountable for specified changes in high-level outcomes.
Discussion: Such ease of measurement and attribution occurs in cases where there is only one provider organization influencing higher-level outcomes in the outcomes hierarchy and it can be easily proved that the activity of the specific intervention organization causes the changes in the high-level outcomes.
Principle: Accountability specification (contracting) in difficult to measure and attribute outcomes hierarchies - In outcomes hierarchies where it is relatively difficult to measure and attribute high-level outcomes to a specific intervention organization's intervention(s), accountability specification (contracting) there are three possible approaches: [Provisional only].
Approach 1: Accountable for outputs only - contracting for outputs.
This approach just requires that outputs
are met where outputs are influencible, controllable, measurable, attributable
and things for which the provider organization can clearly be held accountable
(i.e. goods and services).
Approach 2: Accountable for outputs and also managing for outcomes/maintain an outcomes focus - outcomes aligned contracting.
This approach requires the provider
organization to be responsible for outputs as in Approach 1, but to in some way
also to “manage for outcomes/maintain an outcomes focus”. Maintaining such a focus is not as
strong a requirement as “being accountable/responsible for outcomes”; it just
requires that the provider organization focus in a disciplined manner on
attempting to work out the most effective lower level outcomes hierarchy to
achieve high-level outcomes. This
is in contrast to the provider organization just blindly continuing to deliver
outputs regardless of whether they’re achieving an effective lower level
outcomes hierarchy (which is the potential disadvantage of Approach 1).
Approach 3: Accountable for outcomes that are not fully controllable by the provider organization - contracting for not fully controllable outcomes.
This approach moves away from the provider organization just being accountable for outputs to it also being accountable for some high-level outcomes even where there is a significant likelihood that other factors will affect these outcomes. So these outcomes are influencible, not-necessarily fully controllable, measurable, and not-necessarily attributable. This approach is used, for instance, in the private sector in regard to part of the payment of senior executives (e.g. performance bonuses or options linked to the corporation’s share price).
Discussion: For a detailed practically focused discussion of contracting for outcomes see Contracting for outcomes: A Systematic Outcomes Analysis approach using Outcomes Is It Working Analysis (OIIWA) here.
Principle: Intervention organization accountability only where reasonable autonomy in strategy selection - For an intervention organization to be held accountable for achieving outcomes within an outcomes hierarchy, it must have reasonable autonomy in strategy selection.
Discussion: It is not appropriate for a control organization to hold an intervention organization accountable for achieving outcomes within an outcomes hierarchy in the case where the intervention organization suffers from major external constraints on its ability to select from the range of potentially effective interventions. Such constraints typically include: insufficient resources, legal requirements, political and risk management requirements. In the diagram below the intervention organization is constrained from using interventions related to lower-level outcomes 4.1 and 4.5.
V1-1